StyxX65 d8083eb0c0 feat: interface PIN, bulk disposition tagging, Google Drive delta scan, OCR memory fixes

- Interface PIN: optional session-level auth gate for the main scanner UI
  (Settings → Security → Interface PIN). Salted SHA-256 in config.json,
  rate-limited (5 attempts/5 min per IP). /view and viewer auth exempt.
  New /login page, before_request hook, GET/POST/DELETE /api/interface/pin,
  POST /api/interface/pin/verify, POST /api/interface/logout.

- Bulk disposition tagging: Select mode (filter bar "Vælg" button) reveals
  per-card checkboxes. Bulk tag bar at bottom of grid; POST /api/db/disposition/bulk.
  Disposition stats bar (total · unreviewed · retain · delete · % reviewed)
  updates after every save.

- Google Drive delta scan: uses Drive Changes API when delta is enabled.
  Per-user token stored as gdrive:{email} in delta.json. Load-then-merge
  save avoids racing with concurrent M365 token writes.

- PDF OCR OOM fix: render one page at a time with convert_from_path
  (first_page=N, last_page=N). Added _ocr_mem_ok() psutil guard (500 MB
  threshold) before each page render across scan_pdf, redact_fitz_pdf,
  redact_pdf.

- Email test message translation fix: routes/email.py returns structured
  {ok, method, recipients} instead of a hardcoded English string;
  scheduler.js builds the translated message client-side.

- Docs: CHANGELOG, README, TODO, MANUAL-EN, MANUAL-DA all updated.
  Lang files (en/da/de) extended with bulk, interface PIN, and SMTP keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-04-18 18:46:45 +02:00

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GDPRScanner — Claude Code Context

A GDPR compliance scanner for Danish educational and municipal organisations. Scans Microsoft 365 (Exchange, OneDrive, SharePoint, Teams), Google Workspace (Gmail, Google Drive), and local/SMB file systems for CPR numbers and PII. Produces Excel reports, GDPR Article 30 Word documents, and supports disposition tagging, bulk deletion, scheduled scans, and multi-language UI.

How to run

source venv/bin/activate
python gdpr_scanner.py          # http://0.0.0.0:5100 (all interfaces)
python -m pytest tests/ -q

Architecture

Entry point: gdpr_scanner.py — Flask app, scan orchestration globals. SSE route must stay here — blueprints can't stream.

Split modules: scan_engine.py (M365 + file scan), sse.py (SSE broadcast), checkpoint.py, app_config.py (all persistence), cpr_detector.py

Google Drive delta scan — routes/google_scan.py reads scan_opts.get("delta", False) (same flag as M365). Per user, delta key is f"gdrive:{user_email}" stored in ~/.gdprscanner/delta.json alongside M365 tokens. First delta-enabled scan fetches all files then records a Changes API start page token via conn.get_drive_start_token(user_email). Subsequent scans call conn.get_drive_changes(user_email, token) (Changes API) and update the token. Token save loads the current file fresh before writing ({**current_tokens, **_new_drive_tokens}) to avoid overwriting M365 tokens written by a concurrent scan thread. Invalid/expired tokens fall back to full scan automatically. google_scan_done now includes "delta": bool and "delta_sources": int.

Shared content processing — all three scan engines (M365, Google, file) funnel downloaded bytes through a single function: cpr_detector._scan_bytes(content, filename). It dispatches to the correct parser by file extension. scan_engine.py uses the _scan_bytes_timeout wrapper for PDFs (subprocess + hard timeout). routes/google_scan.py uses _scan_bytes directly. Do not duplicate file-type handling in per-source code.

_scan_bytes injection pattern — scan_engine.py defines a no-op stub for _scan_bytes / _scan_bytes_timeout at module level (avoids circular import). gdpr_scanner.py overwrites them with the real cpr_detector implementations at startup. routes/google_scan.py resolves them lazily via gdpr_scanner.__getattr__. This is intentional — do not try to import them directly in those modules.

Blueprints in routes/ — see routes/CLAUDE.md for state/SSE rules.

Frontend: templates/index.html (SPA), static/style.css (all styles), static/js/*.js (11 ES modules + state.js). static/app.js is an archived monolith — no longer loaded.

Data dir ~/.gdprscanner/: scanner.db, config.json, settings.json, schedule.json, token.json, delta.json, checkpoint.json, smtp.json, machine_id (never delete — Fernet key), role_overrides.json, google_sa.json, google.json, src_toggles.json, app.lock, viewer_tokens.json

Non-obvious files

File	Why it's not obvious
`app_config.py`	All persistence — profiles, settings, SMTP, lang loading, viewer tokens + PIN
`routes/state.py`	Shared mutable state + scan locks (not a typical Flask state file)
`routes/google_scan.py`	Google scan execution lives here, not in `google_connector.py`
`routes/viewer.py`	Viewer token + PIN API; also owns brute-force rate-limit state
`static/js/viewer.js`	Share modal, token CRUD, viewer PIN settings UI
`lang/da.json`	Primary language — source of truth is `en.json`
`build_gdpr.py`	Desktop app builder; contains embedded `LAUNCHER_CODE` for PyInstaller

Tests

128 tests in tests/. No integration tests for Flask routes or live M365/Google connections.

Viewer mode (#33) — routes/viewer.py + static/js/viewer.js

Read-only access for DPOs and reviewers. Key invariants:

/view auth chain — token (?token=) → session cookie (session["viewer_ok"]) → PIN form (if PIN configured) → 403. Never skip this order.
window.VIEWER_MODE — injected by Jinja2 in index.html. auth.js reads it at startup; adds viewer-mode class to <body>. All hide rules are CSS (body.viewer-mode …), not scattered JS checks — except delBtn in the card builder which is also guarded in JS. Hidden in viewer mode: .sidebar (entire left panel), #logWrap, #progressBar, scan/stop/profile/bulk-delete buttons, share button.
window.VIEWER_SCOPE — injected alongside VIEWER_MODE. Contains the scope dict from the token (e.g. {"role": "student"}). Empty object {} means unrestricted. auth.js reads it at startup; if VIEWER_SCOPE.role is set, it pre-sets #filterRole to that value and hides the dropdown so the viewer cannot change it.
Token scope — stored as "scope": {"role": "student"|"staff"} or "scope": {} in each token dict inside viewer_tokens.json. Enforced in two places: server-side (GET /api/db/flagged skips items whose role column does not match session["viewer_scope"].role) and client-side (the #filterRole dropdown is locked). Server-side is the authoritative guard.
session["viewer_scope"] — set when a token is validated at /view. Persists for the browser session alongside session["viewer_ok"]. Reads from session.get("viewer_scope", {}) in /api/db/flagged — defaults to {} (unrestricted) for PIN-authenticated sessions and legacy tokens without a scope key.
viewer_tokens.json format — stored as {"tokens": [...], "__pin__": {"hash": "…", "salt": "…"}}. Token dicts now include "scope": {}. The old bare-list format and tokens without a scope key are handled transparently (t.get("scope", {})). Do not write the file as a bare list.
app.secret_key — derived from machine_id bytes so Flask sessions survive restarts. Set once at startup in gdpr_scanner.py; do not override it.
GET /api/db/flagged — returns get_session_items() (last completed scan session, joined with dispositions), filtered by session["viewer_scope"].role when set. Used exclusively by _loadViewerResults() in results.js. Do not confuse with get_flagged_items() (single scan_id, no disposition join).
Rate-limit state (_pin_attempts dict in routes/viewer.py) — in-memory only, resets on server restart. Intentional — a restart clears lockouts without a persistent store.
User-scoped tokens (#34) — scope {"user": ["alice@m365.dk", "alice@gws.dk"], "display_name": "Alice Smith"} filters GET /api/db/flagged by account_id IN (list), covering both M365 and GWS items for the same person. scope.user is always stored as a list; a legacy single-string value is coerced to [string] on read. scope.display_name is used for UI only (badge, viewer header) — not for filtering. File-scan items (account_id = "") never appear in user-scoped views. POST /api/viewer/tokens rejects combined role+user scope with 400. Share modal: scope-type <select> (#shareScopeType) reveals either the role dropdown (#shareScopeRoleWrap) or a name-search autocomplete (#shareScopeUserWrap). Autocomplete reads S._allUsers; selecting a row stores { emails, display_name } in module-level _selectedScopeUser; editing the input manually clears it (free-text email fallback). In viewer mode, auth.js shows #viewerIdentityBadge with VIEWER_SCOPE.display_name.
Token onclick attributes — Copy/Revoke buttons in _renderTokenList() pass the token as a single-quoted JS string literal ('\'' + tok.token + '\''), never via JSON.stringify. JSON.stringify produces double-quoted strings that break the surrounding onclick="…" HTML attribute.
Settings Security pane — Admin PIN and Viewer PIN groups live in stPaneSecurity, not stPaneGeneral. switchSettingsTab('security') in sources.js triggers both stLoadPinStatus() and stLoadViewerPinStatus(). The Share modal Configure button opens openSettings('security').
stClearViewerPin guard — validates that the current-PIN field is non-empty client-side before sending the DELETE request; shows an inline error and focuses the field if empty.
Share link base URL — _getShareBaseUrl() in viewer.js fetches /api/local_ip (returns the machine's LAN IP via a UDP probe to 8.8.8.8) and substitutes it so copied links are routable from other machines. Falls back to window.location.origin on error. Both createShareLink and copyTokenLink are async and await this helper. Do not revert to a bare window.location.origin — that produces 127.0.0.1 links useless to remote viewers.
Flask binds to 0.0.0.0 — gdpr_scanner.py default --host, m365_launcher.py, and build_gdpr.py all use host="0.0.0.0". Internal loopback URLs (urllib exports, webview window, port probe) intentionally keep 127.0.0.1 — do not change those to 0.0.0.0.

Sources panel resize — static/js/log.js + sources.js

_fitSourcesPanel() — called at the end of every renderSourcesPanel() call. Clears the panel's inline height, reads scrollHeight (natural content height), then either restores a saved smaller preference from localStorage (gdpr_sources_h) or pins the height to scrollHeight. This keeps the panel exactly as tall as needed to show all sources.
_initSourcesResize() — attaches pointer-drag to #sourcesResizeHandle. On pointerdown it captures scrollHeight as the hard max; drag up shrinks, drag down is capped at that max. Saves to localStorage on release; clears the key if the user drags back to full height.
Do not add a fixed max-height or height to #sourcesPanel in HTML — height is controlled entirely by _fitSourcesPanel() at runtime.
Do not call _fitSourcesPanel() before the panel has rendered — scrollHeight will be 0. The call in renderSourcesPanel() is the correct hook; _initSourcesResize() only sets up the drag handler.

Both options live in the profile options dict and apply to all three scan engines (M365, Google, file scan).

skip_gps_images (bool, default false) — When enabled, images whose only PII is GPS coordinates are not flagged. GPS data is still extracted and stored in the card exif field if the item is flagged by another signal (faces, EXIF author/comment). The gps_location special category is also suppressed. Evaluated via _exif_has_pii which rechecks pii_fields and author when GPS is skipped.
min_cpr_count (int, default 1) — Minimum number of distinct CPR numbers in a file before it is flagged. Deduplication uses list(dict.fromkeys(cprs)) to preserve order. Files with faces or EXIF PII are still flagged regardless of CPR count — the threshold gates only CPR-based hits.
File scan reads both from source dict keys (passed directly from the /api/file_scan/start payload). M365 scan reads both from scan_opts = options.get("options", {}). Both paths apply the same _cpr_qualifies / _exif_has_pii logic before the flagging gate.
UI: sidebar controls #optSkipGps (toggle) and #optMinCpr (number); profile editor controls #peOptSkipGps and #peOptMinCpr. Both are saved/loaded by profiles.js.

M365 connector exceptions — m365_connector.py

Exception hierarchy (all inherit M365Error(Exception)):

Exception	Trigger	Handler
`M365PermissionError`	403 Forbidden	`scan_error` broadcast with human-readable permission hint
`M365DeltaTokenExpired`	410 Gone on delta endpoint	Caller clears token and falls back to full scan
`M365DriveNotFound`	404 Not Found on any path	`scan_phase` broadcast ("not provisioned — skipped") in `_scan_user_onedrive`; full-scan path's `except Exception: return` also silences it

M365DriveNotFound — why it exists: _get() previously fell through to raise_for_status() on 404, which was caught by the generic except Exception handler in _scan_user_onedrive and broadcast as a red scan_error. The full-scan path (_iter_drive_folder_for) silently swallowed the same 404 via except Exception: return. Adding the specific exception makes the delta path consistent with the full-scan path: a user without a provisioned OneDrive is skipped without an error card. Common causes: no OneDrive licence, service plan disabled, drive never initialised (account never signed in), account suspended.

Do not add a 404 handler to _get() that returns a fallback value — that would silently mask genuine path bugs elsewhere. Raising M365DriveNotFound keeps the error visible to callers that need to act on it.

Memory management — scan_engine.py

Large M365 tenants can generate enormous memory pressure. Key rules to preserve:

Email body stripped at collection time — _scan_user_email calls conn.get_message_body_text(msg), stores the result as msg["_precomputed_body"], then deletes msg["body"] and msg["bodyPreview"] before appending to work_items. The processing loop reads meta.pop("_precomputed_body", ""). Do not re-add body to the $select query without also stripping it here.
work_items → deque before processing — converted with deque(work_items) and drained via popleft() so each item's memory is released immediately after processing. Do not convert back to a list or iterate with enumerate().
del content in file branch — raw download bytes are deleted as soon as content.decode() is done (before NER/PII counting). Both the hit and no-hit paths have explicit del content.
del body_text in email branch — deleted after _broadcast_card call.
PDF OCR rendered page-by-page — document_scanner.scan_pdf (and the redact paths) call convert_from_path(first_page=N, last_page=N) inside the loop, so only one page image is in memory at a time. Do NOT move back to a bulk convert_from_path() call — that allocates all pages at once and triggers OOM kills on large PDFs.
OCR memory guard — _ocr_mem_ok() checks psutil.virtual_memory().available >= 500 MB before each page render. Pages that would exceed this threshold are skipped with a printed warning and recorded as "skipped" in page_methods.
Memory guard — psutil.virtual_memory().available checked before each M365 file download; scan skips the file if < 300 MB free.

Export — routes/export.py

GDPRDb.get_session_sources() — returns a set of source-key strings (e.g. {"gmail", "gdrive", "email"}) for every scan in the current session window. Used by both _build_excel_bytes() and _build_article30_docx() to include zero-hit sources in summary tables. Do not derive the scanned-source set from by_source alone — that dict only contains sources with flagged items.
Excel Summary sheet vs. per-source tabs — the Summary sheet shows all scanned sources (even with 0 items). Per-source tabs are only created for sources with items; an empty tab has no value.
ART.30 breakdown table — iterates scanned_sources (not by_source) so Gmail, Google Drive, etc. appear with 0 | 0 | 0 | — when the scan found nothing.
Role-filtered exports — _build_excel_bytes(role='') and _build_article30_docx(role='') accept role='student' or role='staff'. A local _items list is built at the top of each function and used everywhere instead of state.flagged_items directly — GPS sheet, External transfers sheet, and Art.30 staff/student tables all see only the filtered subset. Route handlers read request.args.get('role', '') and forward it. Filenames get _elever / _ansatte suffix. The #filterRole dropdown in the filter bar drives both the client-side grid filter and the export URL param — do not separate them.

Scan history browser — static/js/history.js + gdpr_db.py + routes/database.py

Allows reviewing results from any past scan session without running a new scan. Key invariants:

S._historyRefScanId — null = live/SSE mode; positive int = viewing a past session (the highest scan_id in that session's 300 s window). Set by loadHistorySession(); cleared to null by exitHistoryMode().
GET /api/db/sessions (routes/database.py) — calls _get_db().get_sessions(). Returns newest-first list; each entry has ref_scan_id, started_at, finished_at, sources (list of source-key strings), flagged_count, total_scanned, delta (bool). No auth restriction — viewer tokens share this endpoint.
get_sessions(limit=50, window_seconds=300) (gdpr_db.py) — groups scans rows by 300 s window (same window logic as get_session_items). Groups are built ascending, returned descending. ref_scan_id is the highest scan_id in each group. Do not change the window size independently of get_session_items.
get_session_items(ref_scan_id=N) (gdpr_db.py) — when ref_scan_id is given, anchors the 300 s window to that scan's started_at. Falls back to latest scan when ref_scan_id=None.
GET /api/db/flagged?ref=N — passes ref_scan_id to get_session_items; viewer scope enforcement (role/user filters) still applies. Used by both history mode and the normal post-scan viewer path.
History banner (#historyBanner) — shown when S._historyRefScanId is set. Contains #historyBannerText (session date · sources · N items), #historyPickerBtn (opens #historyDropdown), and #historyLatestBtn (visible only when the viewed session is not the latest). Do not hide/show these elements from outside history.js.
Session picker (#historyDropdown) — rendered inside [data-history-wrap] container so the outside-click handler (document listener, closes on clicks outside [data-history-wrap]) works correctly. Do not move the picker outside this wrapper.
Cache invalidation — _sessions and _latestRefScanId are module-level in history.js. invalidateHistoryCache() clears both. All three *_done SSE handlers in scan.js call window.invalidateHistoryCache?.() so the picker reflects the newest scan after completion.
Auto-load on page load — results.js calls window.loadHistorySession?.(null) once when the SSE watchdog confirms !status.running. null resolves to the latest completed session via _fetchSessions()[0].ref_scan_id. The _initialStatusChecked guard ensures this fires at most once per page load.
Mode transitions — startScan() calls window.exitHistoryMode?.() before clearing the grid, so any history banner is dismissed and S._historyRefScanId is reset before SSE events start arriving.

SSE teardown — static/js/scan.js

Do not close S.es in scan_done if other scans are still running — M365 (scan_done), Google (google_scan_done), and File (file_scan_done) each emit their own done event. If M365 finishes first and the SSE is closed, the remaining done events are never received and the UI hangs at 100% indefinitely.
Rule: close S.es (and reset S._userStartedScan) only inside the branch where all concurrent scans have finished: scan_done checks !S._googleScanRunning && !S._fileScanRunning; google_scan_done checks !S._m365ScanRunning && !S._fileScanRunning; file_scan_done checks !S._m365ScanRunning && !S._googleScanRunning.
Scheduled scans — S._userStartedScan is false for scheduler-triggered runs, so the SSE connection is never closed and future scheduler events continue to arrive.

Email sending — routes/email.py + m365_connector.py

_post() returns {} on empty body — m365_connector._post() returns r.json() if r.content else {}. The Graph sendMail endpoint returns HTTP 202 with no body on success; calling r.json() on an empty response raises JSONDecodeError. Do not change this back to an unconditional r.json() — it would falsely report every successful email send as an error.
Graph preferred over SMTP — smtp_test and send_report both try _send_email_graph() first when state.connector is authenticated. Only falls back to SMTP if Graph raises. If Graph fails and no SMTP host is saved, the Graph exception is surfaced directly (not swallowed by the "No SMTP host" message).
Gmail vs Google Workspace detection — auth error handlers check whether the SMTP username ends in @gmail.com / @googlemail.com. If not, the account is treated as Google Workspace (custom domain) and the error message points to the Workspace admin console rather than the user's personal security settings.

Global gotchas

Pattern matching in Python — when using str.replace() to patch JS/HTML, whitespace and quote style must match exactly. Use in check first and print if not found.
__getattr__ on modules — only resolves module.name access from outside, not bare name lookups inside function bodies. Always import directly.
JSON.stringify inside onclick="…" attributes — produces double-quoted strings that terminate the HTML attribute early. Use single-quoted JS string literals instead, or data-* attributes read from the handler.

Directory-scoped rules

routes/CLAUDE.md — SSE constraints, scan_progress source field, file_sources, Python gotchas
static/js/CLAUDE.md — profile dropdown, progress bar phase parsing, JS gotchas
templates/CLAUDE.md — CSS variable names, sizing rules, badge standard, design rules
lang/CLAUDE.md — i18n conventions

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