GDPRScanner/routes/CLAUDE.md

Routes — Architecture Rules

SSE constraints

SSE routes must live in gdpr_scanner.py, not blueprints — blueprints can't stream.

M365 scan emits scan_done; Google emits google_scan_done; file scan emits file_scan_done. Never mix them up.

scan_start is M365-only — run_scan() broadcasts scan_start; run_file_scan() and routes/google_scan.py must NOT. The scan_start handler in _attachSchedulerListeners (scan.js) unconditionally sets S._m365ScanRunning = true. If a file scan emits scan_start, the flag is set with no matching scan_done to clear it — file_scan_done checks !S._m365ScanRunning before re-enabling the scan button, so the button stays disabled permanently after the scan completes.

scan_progress source field

All three scan engines must include "source": "m365" / "google" / "file" in every scan_progress SSE event. Never remove this field — the frontend uses it to route progress to the correct segment.

file_sources

file_sources in profiles are stored as source ID strings by the JS frontend. The scheduler resolves them via _load_file_sources() before calling run_file_scan().

Circular import prohibition

scan_engine.py and gdpr_scanner.py must not import each other. scan_engine imports from sse, checkpoint, app_config, cpr_detector; gdpr_scanner imports scan functions from scan_engine.

_scan_bytes injection

scan_engine.py declares stub versions of _scan_bytes / _scan_bytes_timeout at module level. gdpr_scanner.py replaces them with the real cpr_detector implementations at startup. routes/google_scan.py pulls them from gdpr_scanner via __getattr__. Never import these directly in blueprint or engine modules — that breaks the circular-import barrier.

M365 connector exceptions — m365_connector.py

Exception hierarchy (all inherit M365Error(Exception)):

Exception	Trigger	Handler
M365PermissionError	403 Forbidden	scan_error broadcast with human-readable permission hint
M365DeltaTokenExpired	410 Gone on delta endpoint	Caller clears token and falls back to full scan
M365DriveNotFound	404 Not Found on any path	scan_phase broadcast ("not provisioned — skipped") in _scan_user_onedrive; full-scan path's except Exception: return also silences it

M365DriveNotFound — why it exists: _get() previously fell through to raise_for_status() on 404, which was caught by the generic except Exception handler and broadcast as a red scan_error. Adding the specific exception makes the delta path consistent with the full-scan path: a user without a provisioned OneDrive is skipped silently. Do not add a 404 handler to _get() that returns a fallback value — that would silently mask genuine path bugs.

Export — routes/export.py

• GDPRDb.get_session_sources() — returns a set of source-key strings for every scan in the current session window. Used by both _build_excel_bytes() and _build_article30_docx() to include zero-hit sources in summary tables. Do not derive the scanned-source set from by_source alone — that dict only contains sources with flagged items.
• Excel Summary sheet — shows all scanned sources (even with 0 items). Per-source tabs only created for sources with items.
• ART.30 breakdown table — iterates scanned_sources (not by_source) so Gmail, Drive, etc. appear with 0 | 0 | 0 | — when the scan found nothing.
• Role-filtered exports — _build_excel_bytes(role='') and _build_article30_docx(role='') accept role='student' or role='staff'. A local _items list is built at the top of each function; GPS sheet, External transfers sheet, and Art.30 tables all see only the filtered subset. Filenames get _elever / _ansatte suffix.
• POST /api/redact_item — rewrites a file in-place with CPR numbers replaced by ██████-████ / █ blocks, removes the card from the grid, logs a "redacted" disposition. Source types: local (DOCX/XLSX/CSV/TXT/PDF, written via temp+move), onedrive/sharepoint/teams (Graph download → redact → PUT, requires Files.ReadWrite.All), gdrive (Drive API, requires drive scope), sftp (paramiko read/write, item must still be in state.flagged_items), smb (smbprotocol FILE_SUPERSEDE). Keep _redactExts/_cloudRedactExts in results.js and _REDACT_EXTS/_GDRIVE_MIME_MAP/_ALL_REDACTABLE_TYPES in export.py in sync — the button and the route must agree.
• PDF redaction — redact_pdf_secure uses PyMuPDF page.apply_redactions() (physical removal). Falls back to reportlab overlay if PyMuPDF absent. Text pages use find_cpr_char_bboxes; scanned pages use OCR at 200 DPI + find_cpr_image_bboxes.

Preview — routes/database.py

GET /api/preview/<item_id>?source_type=…&account_id=… dispatches by source_type:

• local / smb — re-reads from disk; renders images as data URIs, text/CSV/PDF/DOCX/XLSX inline.
• email — fetches M365 message body via Graph (requires state.connector).
• gmail — shows info card with "Open in Gmail" link (X-Frame-Options blocks embedding).
• gdrive — returns https://drive.google.com/file/d/{id}/preview iframe.
• All other values (M365 files) — calls Graph /preview POST; tries drive_id-based path first, then user-drive, then /me/drive.

_source_type must be set in google_scan.py — Gmail items need meta["_source_type"] = "gmail" and Drive items "gdrive" before _broadcast_card. Without it, cards fall through to the M365 branch, which calls Graph with a Gmail ID and gets a 404.

state.connector guard — only the email and M365 else branches require M365 auth. The local/smb/gmail/gdrive branches must not gate on state.connector — they work in Google-only deployments.

Compliance audit log — gdpr_db.py + routes/

• audit_log table — created by _DDL (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS), auto-appears on next server start. Schema: id, ts (Unix float), action, actor, detail, ip.
• log_audit_event(action, detail, actor, ip) — module-level helper; silently no-ops on any exception. Import: from gdpr_db import log_audit_event as _audit.
• GET /api/audit_log?limit=200&action=<filter> — in routes/app_routes.py. No auth gate.
• Recorded events — profile_save/delete, token_create/revoke, viewer_pin_set/change/clear, interface_pin_set/change/clear, source_add/update/delete, scheduler_job_save/delete, scan_start/stop, smtp_save, disposition, disposition_bulk, admin_pin_set/change, item_delete, item_redact.
• actor always empty — no per-user login; field reserved for future use.

Email sending — routes/email.py + m365_connector.py

• _post() returns {} on empty body — Graph sendMail returns HTTP 202 with no body; r.json() on empty raises JSONDecodeError. Do not revert to unconditional r.json().
• Graph preferred over SMTP — smtp_test and send_report try _send_email_graph() first; fall back to SMTP only if Graph raises. If Graph fails and no SMTP host saved, the Graph exception surfaces directly.
• Auto-email after manual scan — _maybe_send_auto_email() in routes/scan.py called from the _run() thread after run_scan() returns. Reads smtp_cfg.get("auto_email_manual"); no-ops if false, no flagged items, or no recipients.
• Gmail vs Google Workspace — auth error handlers check if SMTP username ends in @gmail.com/@googlemail.com; custom domains are treated as Google Workspace and error message points to the Workspace admin console.

Scheduler — scan_scheduler.py + routes/scheduler.py

• Job config keys — id, name, enabled, frequency (daily/weekly/monthly), day_of_week, day_of_month, hour, minute, profile_id, auto_email, auto_retention, retention_years, fiscal_year_end, report_only. Stored in ~/.gdprscanner/schedule.json.
• _execute_scan(job_id) — acquires per-job lock (_running_jobs set), records DB run via db.begin_schedule_run(), runs M365 → file → Google pipeline, then emails and applies retention. DB run finalised in finally.
• Report-only path — when report_only=True, short-circuits before M365 auth check, populates _m.flagged_items from db.get_session_items() if empty, calls _send_email_report(). Does NOT acquire scan lock; fails with RuntimeError("No scan results available") if DB is also empty.
• _m.flagged_items and state.flagged_items are the same object — assigned at startup; in-place updates (flagged_items[:] = ...) propagate to both.
• scheduler_started / scheduler_done SSE events — separate from scan_done (M365). scheduler_done carries flagged, scanned, emailed, job_name.
• Profile options merge into file sources — scheduler unpacks {**fs, **_fs_extra} before calling run_file_scan(fs). Do not pass fs directly — the file scan reads source.get(...) and silently falls back to defaults without the merge.

Claude NER — document_scanner.py + app_config.py + routes/app_routes.py

Optional AI-powered NER replacing spaCy. Activated via config.json keys claude_ner (bool) and claude_api_key (str).

• ANTHROPIC_OK — module-level flag in document_scanner.py; True if anthropic is importable. Guards all Claude code paths.
• _ner_claude(text, api_key) — calls claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 in 8 000-char chunks. Thread-safe cache keyed by hash(text), evicts oldest when > 2 000 entries.
• GET/POST /api/settings/claude — GET returns {"enabled": bool, "api_key_set": bool} (never exposes key). POST accepts {"enabled": bool, "api_key": "..."} — omitting api_key leaves stored key unchanged.
• POST /api/settings/claude/test — minimal 8-token API call; returns {"ok": true} or {"ok": false, "error": "..."}.
• Do not import anthropic at module level outside document_scanner.py — routes/app_routes.py imports it locally inside the function body so the server starts without the package.

Viewer mode — routes/viewer.py

• /view auth chain — token (?token=) → session cookie (session["viewer_ok"]) → PIN form → 403. Never skip this order.
• Token scope — stored as "scope": {"role": "student"|"staff"}, {"user": [...], "display_name": "..."}, or {} in viewer_tokens.json. Enforced server-side in GET /api/db/flagged. Column name is user_role — do not use role.
• session["viewer_scope"] — set at /view token validation. GET /api/db/flagged reads session.get("viewer_scope", {}) — defaults to {} (unrestricted) for PIN-authenticated sessions.
• viewer_tokens.json format — {"tokens": [...], "__pin__": {"hash": "…", "salt": "…"}}. Old bare-list format handled transparently. Do not write as bare list.
• Rate-limit state (_pin_attempts dict) — in-memory only, resets on server restart. Intentional.
• User-scoped tokens — scope.user always a list; legacy single-string coerced on read. File-scan items (account_id = "") never appear in user-scoped views. POST /api/viewer/tokens rejects combined role+user scope with 400.
• Date-range scoping — valid_from/valid_to (YYYY-MM-DD) in scope dict; filtered via lexicographic string comparison in GET /api/db/flagged. Server validates format and enforces valid_from ≤ valid_to.
• app.secret_key — derived from machine_id bytes so sessions survive restarts. Set once at startup; do not override.
• Flask binds to 0.0.0.0 — gdpr_scanner.py, m365_launcher.py, and build_gdpr.py all use host="0.0.0.0". Internal loopback URLs intentionally keep 127.0.0.1.

Gotchas

• _load_settings() return — does NOT include file_sources. Returns only: sources, user_ids, options, retention_years, fiscal_year_end, email_to.
• _save_settings() clobbers profile fields — called on every M365 scan start with only M365 sources/user_ids/options. The fix in app_config.py preserves google_sources and file_sources and rebuilds sources as m365_src + google_src + file_src. Do not simplify away this merge logic.
• loadLastScanSummary() timing — must only be called after the first /api/scan/status poll resolves (inside _sseWatchdog in results.js, guarded by _initialStatusChecked). Calling it on DOMContentLoaded shows a stale "no results" card during a live scan after a hard refresh.